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STATE LIQUOR AFFIRMATION PRACTICES:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTITRUST
PROBLEMS

I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 1971, the attention of Pennsylvania citizens was
focused for the first time on a situation which has existed within
the national liquor 1 industry virtually without question since 1938.
The national affirmation 2 policy-under which liquor manufacturers affirm under oath that the price at which liquor is being offered is no higher than the lowest price at which it is offered anywhere else in the nation-has received sharp and continued criticism from the chief counsel of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board, 3 who has charged that because of affirmation, Pennsylvania
citizens were being forced to4 pay inflated prices on liquor purchased from state liquor stores.
The public controversy reached a crescendo on April 21, 1972.
At a public hearing held by the P.L.C.B. to investigate price increases, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, J. Shane Creamer,
summarized the situation as he understood it, recommending immediate legal action:
It is apparent then that Pennsylvania has had a problem in the operation of its monopoly system. It has one
of the highest retail consumer price structures in the nation yet simultaneously has suffered a comparatively low
realization of revenue returned to the Commonwealth.
This anomalous position results in part from the so-called
1. The term "liquor" as used in this Comment shall mean what is
commonly known as "hard liquor," i.e. whiskies, rums, cordials, brandies,
gins, wines, etc. The term is defined by the Pennsylvania Liquor Code,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-102 (1969), as:
any alcoholic, spiritous, vinous, fermented or otherwise alcoholic,
including all drinks or drinkable mixtures, and reused, recovered,
or redistilled denatured alcohol usable or taxable for beverage
purposes which contain more than one-half of one per cent of
alcohol by volume, except pure ethyl alcohol and malt or brewed
beverages.
2. See notes 67-76 and accompanying text infra.
3. The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board [hereinafter referred to
as P.L.C.B. or the Board] is an administrative body established in 1933,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-207 (1969) to regulate and supervise the sale
of alcoholic beverage within the Commonwealth. One of its primary
responsibilities is the operation of "State Stores," the only permissible
bottle sales outlet for liquor within the state.
4. Press release from the Office of the Chief Counsel, P.L.C.B., Feb.
26, 1972.

"National Affirmation Policy" and in part from the markup policies of the Liquor Control Board dating back to
1955.
In actual practice affirmation laws have permitted
liquor manufacturers to maintain artifically high wholesale prices; under the present system manufacturers can
raise their prices at will.
It is time for the affirmation laws to be challenged.
In light of the experience gained over the past eight years
since passage of the original New York statute, I am
convinced that such statutes are unconstitutional. These
laws and the regulations and policies adopted in their
wake work to the detriment of Pennsylvania consumers
who are forced to pay more than is justified considering
Pennsylvania's tremendous buying power. Affirmation
should be strangled before it strangles us.,
The recommendations of Pennsylvania's Attorney General
were shortly followed. On December 5, 1972, the Pennsylvania
Department of Justice brought suit in the Supreme Court of the
United States on behalf of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
against twenty-five states, 6 charging that the affirmation practices
of each of these states placed an undue burden on interstate commerce. 7
This Comment will trace the development of the national affirmation policy, discuss its practical effect upon one state-Pennsylvania-and analyze the constitutionality of affirmation statutes, regulations and policies under the commerce clause,8 the privileges and immunities clause, 9 and the twenty-first amendment 0
of the Federal Constitution, employing as a representative example the New York Statute."
II.

BACKGROUND

On December 5, 1933, the twenty-first amendment 2 to the
United States Constitution was ratified, repealing the eighteenth
5. Statement of the Attorney General Before the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board at Public Hearing on April 21, 1972.
6. The states as named were: New York, Kansas, Massachusetts, New
Mexico, South Carolina, Georgia, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Alabama, Idaho,
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia
and Wyoming.
7. Although the Court has twice refused to hear arguments on this
case, it should be noted that these constitute denial of original jurisdiction.
Pennsylvania is at present seeking adjudication of the question through
other channels, and it is possible that the Court will again be faced with
the question.
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
11. N.Y. ALco. BEv. CONTROL § 101-b-3 (McKinney Supp. 1964).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
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amendment 5 and thereby ending the nearly thirteen year reign
of prohibition. Shortly thereafter, in 1935, representatives of several states met in Des Moines, Iowa, deliberated for nearly three
weeks and concluded by signing a pact which was to become
known as the Des Moines Convention.
Exactly what prompted these men to convene is unclear, but
the result of their meeting is a matter of record. A resolution
was adopted to the effect that every state purchasing liquor for
14
distribution through state owned and operated retail outlets
would insist, as a condition of purchase, that the vendor contractually agree that the sales price on each offered item would be no
higher than the lowest price at which the same product was being
offered anywhere else in the nation."'
The document itself was never made public, but its effects
were clear. Each control state maintained close price checks on
every other control state, and when a pricing discrepancy appeared,
notification was given to the concerned liquor vendor, requesting
reimbursement for the overcharge under the terms of the contractual agreement. The procedure functioned smoothly, assuring
each control state identical wholesale pricing regardless of the
number of cases purchased annually. Inherent in the system,
however, was a problem: it failed to include the thirty-two noncontrol' states within its guaranteed minimum price structure.
In 1963, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York (a non13. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
14. Such states are commonly known as, and hereinafter referred to
as, "Control states." At the time of the Convention, there were sixteen
control states, including Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. Today control states
include all of the above, plus Alabama and Mississippi and Montgomery
County, Maryland.
15. Affirmation is required by law in Kansas, Massachusetts, New
Mexico, New York, and South Carolina. The states of Georgia, New Jersey
and Oklahoma require affirmation by regulation. Affirmation is authorized
by law in the State of Maryland, but it has never been implemented by the
administrator. The following states, which include the eighteen control
states as well as the 117 county and city boards of North Carolina, plus
Montgomery County, Maryland, require a price guarantee based on the
quotations and the purchase orders: Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and
Wyoming.
16. These "license" states include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas.

control or license state) reacted to this situation by appointing a
Moreland Commission to undertake:
[a] thorough study and reappraisal of the [New York Alcoholic Bevarage Control] Law with respect to the sale
and distribution of alcoholic beverages irn the state, to
examine and investigate ... the methods and practices of

manufacturers, distributors and retailers of alcoholic bevof the
erages in the State and to propose any revisions
17
New York law which might be found necessary.
The Commission's findings as to pricing were both startling
and illuminating: A comparison of sale prices for eighteen items
in Washington, D.C., also a non-control jurisdiction, and New
York was conducted, revealing that in fifteen instances, Washington retail prices were lower than New York wholesale prices for
the same item."' Governor Rockefeller reported the result:
New York consumers have been compelled to pay on the
average $1.00 more per fifth of liquor than they would
have to pay if there were a free market ....

The total

now runs
bill for this surcharge foisted on New Yorkers
to $150 million a year and it is rising every year.19
On the basis of these findings, among others, 20 the Moreland
Commission recommended that "Section 101-c of the ABC(Alcohol
Beverage Control) Law, which provides for SLA (State Liquor
Authority) enforcement of minimum consumer resale prices fixed
by the distillers, should be repealed."2 1 Upon receipt of this
recommendation, Governor Rockefeller called for immediate repeal of Section 101-c.2 2

The New York Legislature responded

promptly, repealing the offending section by adopting section 11 of
chapter 531 on April 16, 1964.23
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 2-15, February 15, 1963.
New York State Moreland Comm'n on the Alcoholic Beverage
Law, Report and Recommendations No. 3, January 21, 1964, Chart
[hereinafter cited as Moreland Report]:
Price N.Y.
Economy Prices
Wholesale
N.Y.
Washington, D.C.
1/12 of Case Price
Brands
4.99
3.49
3.77
Seagram 7 Crown
6.65
4.99
5.01
Seagram V.O.
6.55
4.99
4.94
Canadian Club
3.39
5.45
4.10
Old Crow 86
4.50
3.18
3.41
Imperial
5.10
3.49
3.83
Jim Beam
4.99
3.49
3.77
Calvert Reserve (Extra)
4.99
3.49
3.77
Schenley Reserve
5.45
3.79
4.11
Early Times
5.95
3.59
4.51
Ancient Age
4.49
2.99
3.40
Corby's Reserve
4.55
3.18
3.44
Flushmann Preferred
4.50
3.18
3.41
Ten High
4.29
5.95
4.51
Old Taylor 86
7.11
5.59
5.25
Cutty Sark
5.19
3.69
3.91
Four Roses
7.09
5.95
5.33
J &B
3.39
4.79
3.61
Kentucky Gentleman
19. Address to the Legislature, February 10, 1964 at 8.
20. See generally Moreland Report, Nos. 1-5.
21. Moreland Report, supra note 18, No. 3, at 30.
22. Address to the Legislature, February 10, 1964 at 9.
23. N.Y. ALco. BEv. CONTROL § 101-b-3 (McKinney Supp. 1964).
17.
18.
Control
3 at 6.

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

It should at this point be noted that the Moreland Report
called only for repeal of section 101-c, 24 thus creating a "free market" 25 and in theory correcting the inflated pricing structure present in the state. The New York legislature went beyond this recommendation, however, instituting sweeping changes.2 6 Reasoning
that "price discrimination and favoritism are contrary to the best
interest and welfare of the people of this state,127 that "fundamental principles of price competition should prevail in the manufacture, sale and distribution of liquor" in New York 28 and that
New York consumers should not be discriminated against by paying prices "unjustifiably higher" 29 than are "paid by consumers in
24.

See text accompanying note 21 supra.
25. See Moreland Report, supra note 18, No. 3, at 9.
26. N.Y. ALco. Bsv. CONTROL § 101-b-3 (McKinney Supp. 1964). This
section provides in part:
(e) There shall be filed in connection with and when filed shall
be deemed part of any other schedule filed for a brand of liquor
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subdivision an affirmation duly
verified by the person filing such schedule that the bottle and case
price of liquor to wholesalers set forth in such schedule is no higher
than the lowest price at which such item of liquor will be sold by
such person to any wholesaler anywhere in any other state of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or to any state (or state
agency) which owns and operates retail liquor stores, (i) at any
time during the calendar month for which such schedule shall be
in effect, and (ii) if a like affirmation has been filed at least once
but was not filed during the calendar month immediately preceding the month in which such schedule is filed, then also at any
time during the calendar months not exceeding six immediately
preceding the month in which such schedule shall be in effect and
succeeding the last calendar month during which a like affirmation
was in effect.
(f) In the event an affirmation with respect to any item of
liquor is not filed within the time provided by this section, any
schedule for which such affirmation is required shall be deemed
invalid with respect to such item of liquor, and no such item may
be sold to or purchased by any wholesaler or retailer during the
period covered by any such schedule.
(g) In determining the lowest price which any item of liquor
was sold in any other state or in the District of Columbia, or to
any state (or state agency) which owns and operates retail
liquor stores, appropriate reductions shall be made to reflect all
discounts in excess of those to be in effect under such schedule,
and all rebates, free goods, allowances and other inducements of
any kind whatsoever offered or given to any such wholesaler or
state (or state agency), as the case may be, purchasing such item
in such other state or in the District of Columbia; provided that
nothing contained in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this subdivision
shall prevent differentials in price which make only due allowance
for differences in state taxes and fees, and in the actual cost of
delivery. As used in this paragraph, the term "state taxes or fees"
shall mean the excise taxes imposed or the fees required by any
state or the District of Columbia upon or based upon the gallon
of liquor, and the term "gallon" shall mean one hundred twentyeight fluid ounces.
27. N.Y. ALco. BEy. CONTROL § 101-b-3, (McKinney Supp. 1964).
28. Id.

29. Id.

other states," 0 the legislature concluded that it was necessary to
enact section 9 of chapter 53131 "in order to forestall possible
monopolistic and anti-competitive practices designed to frustrate
the elimination of such discrimination and disadvantage.

32

Most

important among the provisions of section 9 was a requirement
that distillers of alcoholic beverages could charge New York wholesalers a price "no higher than the lowest price" 3 charged by the
brand owner, a wholesaler designated as his agent or by a "related
person"3 4 to any wholesaler elsewhere in the United States (including any control state) during the immediately preceding
month.3 5 An affirmation to that effect, verified by the vendor,
was required to be filed with the state Alcoholic Beverage Commission each time a price change occurred or a new brand was
listed,30 in the absence of which the item could not be sold in the
state.37 The affirmed price was a net figure, appropriately reduced
by all "discounts, .

.

. rebates, free goods, allowances and other in-

ducements of any kind whatsoever offered or given to any such
wholesaler, state (or state agency) or retailer"3 8 purchasing the
item elsewhere in the country.
These were the provisions of the New York statute, which in
conjunction with similar statutes, regulations and policies of the
other named defendants, Pennsylvania's Attorney General viewed
as unconstitutional 9 because thereunder Pennsylvania citizens
were compelled to pay higher prices for alcoholic beverages than
would otherwise be necessary.40 The bases for this charge were
twofold: First, distillers were thereby freed completely from all
normal commercial checks accompanying at-arms-length transactions; and second, closely tied with the first, Pennsylvania could
not bargain with distillers for prices lower than those offered to
New York, even if such lower prices could be justified.
The argument underlying the first basis was grounded on past
Pennsylvania experience. In 1958, Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons,
Inc. 41 quoted an across-the-board price hike on all of its items offered to the Board. After reviewing general conditions of the industry and the liquor market, the Board concluded that the price
increases were unjustified. This conclusion was presented to Seagrams, accompanied by the suggestion that Seagrams should present some justification for their price rise. The distillers refused,
30.
31.
1964).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
N.Y. ALCO. Bsv. CONTROL § 101-b-3, §§ (d)-(k) (McKinney Supp.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § (h).
Id. § (i).
See text accompanying note 6 supra. See also note 15 supra.
See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
Id.
Hereinafter referred to as "Seagrams."
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and the Board announced that unless prices remained stable or
justification were presented, no further purchases of Seagrams'
products would be made. Faced with this ultimatum, Seagrams
attempted reasoning with the Board, explaining that if prices were
not raised to Pennsylvania, they could not be raised in any of the
other affirmation states, conceding that although the company
might be willing to maintain present prices to Pennsylvania, the
consequences of such an act made it economically impossible.
Pennsylvania responded by threat, delisting all Seagrams products in 1958. This had no effect, however, and in the face of consumer demands, Seagrams products were restored to Pennsylvania's Liquor Store price lists within six months. The Attorney
General suggested that this was a standardized procedure, that any
distiller could at will increase his price without fear that serious
objections would be made, thereby placing both Pennsylvania consumers and consumers throughout the nation at the distillers'
mercy, subject only to their good conscience. 42 Although factual
proof of this allegation is beyond the scope of this Comment, it
should be noted that nothing has been encountered in the course
of research to indicate that the present situation is other than as
described by Pennsylvania's Attorney General.
The second basis for the Attorney General's charge includes
the first, but additionally posits that even if successful negotiations were possible, any pricing concessions gained could not be
realized because foreclosed by affirmation. This argument is a
comparatively simple one, following naturally from the concept of
affirmation. It is perhaps best demonstrated through the medium
of a hypothetical. Suppose the P.L.C.B. successfully negotiates a
price reduction of fifty cents per case on all Seagrams products
because of smaller costs normally associated with large sales to a
single customer. If the products involved are sold only in Pennsylvania, no problem arises. But if sold in any affirmation state,
distinct difficulties are encountered. To comply with affirmation
requirements, Seagrams must offer the same price reduction to
every wholesale purchaser within the affirmation states. This situation can be viewed in two ways: First, since the same price is
being offered everywhere, the price reduction is no longer a discount reflecting lower costs; or second, affirmation flatly forbids a
discount to be given to Pennsylvania because to do so would be to
sell a product to Pennsylvania at a price lower than that offered
to affirmation states. Viewed either way, Pennsylvania is precluded from bargaining for lower prices by affirmation requirements in other states, a situation seen as unconstitutional by
42. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.

Pennsylvania's Attorney General. The remainder of this Comment will consider the legal validity of that contention.
III.

THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

The tenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t] he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people. '43 Under this amendment,
the peoples of the various states, acting through their legislatures,
may exercise any governmental power not given up to the federal
government. 4 4 Among those powers retained by the people is the
exercise of the police power, 45 the power to pass legislation for the
general welfare of the people. It is generally recognized that under
this power a state legislature is virtually unrestricted in the enactment of laws respecting the manufacture, sale, possession, trans46
portation, or use of intoxicating liquor.
With the ratification of the eighteenth amendment 47 on January 29, 1919, these powers underwent major modification. Under
that amendment, the "transportation of intoxicating liquors within,
the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof
for beverage purposes [was] prohibited ....,"48 as of January 29,
1920. Although the amendment did not prohibit a state from enforcing its provisions under existing state statutes, 49 to the extent
that such statutes conformed to the tenor of the amendment,50
state legislation could not, of course, give validity to acts therein
prohibited. 51
All powers removed by the eighteenth amendment were by the
twenty-first amendment restored to the states. 5 2 Greater power
was, however, vested in the federal government than had previ43.

U.S. CoNST. amend. X.

46.

Such local laws derive their force,

44. See Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 338 P. 82 (1934), for a discussion of this question as it pertains to the pardoning power.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
. .

. not from the eight-

eenth amendment, but from power originally belonging to the
states, preserved to them by the 10th amendment, and not relieved
from the restriction heretofore arising out of the Federal Constitution.
United States v. Langa, 260 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1922). See also Manning v.
Davis, 166 Kan. 278, 201 P.2d 113 (1948); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 297
Pa. 498, 147 A. 527 (1929).
47. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
49. United States v. Peterson, 268 F. 864 (D.C. Wash. 1920), rev'd on
other grounds, 260 U.S. 377 (1921). The eighteenth amendment vested
concurrent enforcement powers in Congress and the states.
50. Alexander v. State, 148 Ark. 491, 230 S.W. 548 (1921); Hazel
Drug Co. v. Wilner, 284 Pa. 361, 131 A. 286 (1925); Miller v. Commonwealth,
135 Va. 597, 115 S.E. 512 (1923).
51. See McCormick and Co. v. 'Brown, 286 U.S. 131 (1932).
52. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939). See also Dickinson v.
Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 24 S.E.2d 550 (1943), affd, 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
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ously been enjoyed, in that Congress now had the power to regulate interstate commerce in alcoholic beverages to the point of
complete prohibition. 3
Following ratification of the twenty-first amendment Pennsylvania, in common with every other state in the nation, had the
power to absolutely prohibit the manufacture, transportation, sale
or possession of alcoholic beverages 54 or to condition such manufacture, transportation, sale or possession by measures reasonably
appropriate to effectuate the degree of control deemed by its legislature to be necessary and proper. 5 Pursuant to these powers,
Pennsylvania in 1933 created the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board, 6 vesting in it the power 7
(a) To buy, import or have in its possession for sale, and
sell liquor and alcohol.
(b)

To control the manufacture, possession, sale, consumption, importation, use, storage, transportation
and delivery of liquor, alcohol and malt or brewed
beverages ...

and to fix the wholesale and retail

prices at which liquors and alcohol shall be sold at
Pennsylvania Liquor Stores ....
(c)

[T] o make such regulations . . . as it may deem necessary ....
Such regulations adopted by the Board

shall have the same force as if they formed a part of
this act.5 8
Thus, Pennsylvania's citizens, acting pursuant to the twenty-first
amendment, decided through proper legislative procedures that alcoholic beverages could be sold to and consumed by any adult, 59
provided that such alcoholic beverages be bought through the
medium of state stores owned and operated by the Commonwealth,
subject to such rules and regulations as the P.L.C.B. deemed necessary.
Pennsylvania's Liquor Control Board thus would appear to
have the same basic rights relative to alcoholic beverages as
those enjoyed by the various citizens of the United States prior to
ratification of the eighteenth amendment,60 since the powers re53. Duckworth v. State, 201 Ark. 1123, 148 S.W.2d 656 (1941), af 'd, 314
U.S. 390 (1943) ; Harris v. State, 74 Okla. Crim. 13, 122 P.2d 401 (1942).
54. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
55. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966);
Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Edilbrew
Brewery v. Weiss, 170 Pa. Super. 34, 84 A.2d 371 (1951).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-201 (1969).
57. PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 47, § 2-207 (1969).
58. Id.
59.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1)

60.

See text accompanying notes 43-46 and 52-55 supra.

(1969).

turned to the states under the twenty-first amendment have been
delegated to that body by Pennsylvania's citizens.6 ' One of the
rights thereby conferred to the P.L.C.B. is the right to engage in
interstate commerce of liquor into the state in the same manner as
any citizen, which is absolutely identical to the right to engage in
the interstate commerce of any other merchandise, except as con62
ditioned by federal law.
Any citizen of the United States has the privilege to bargain
for the best price possible on any item purchased, as conditioned by
the jurisdiction in which he is conducting his business, and by federal statute. 63 There appears to be no reason to assume that this
privilege is less viable when applied to transactions involving alcoholic beverages, inasmuch as the ratification of the twenty-first
amendment restored alcohol to parity with other products except
as limited by the federal government or by a state within its own
borders. 64 Thus, this privilege also passed to the P.L.C.B. permitting it to bargain for the best price possible on all purchases unless
restricted by Pennsylvania's own laws or federal statutes.
In order to show that its privilege of purchasing alcoholic
beverages at the lowest price possible has been unconstitutionally
infringed upon under the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 65 Pennsylvania need demonstrate only two
things:6 6 (1) That the purchase of alcoholic beverages at the best
price possible, as limited by her own and federal statutes, is a
privilege arising out of the nature and essential character of the
federal government, granted or secured by the Constitution; and
(2) that such privilege has been unreasonably infringed upon.
This section of the Comment will discuss the legal proof of these
two elements and the probability of success of such an argument,
if legally sound.
By its enactment of section 101-b-3, 67 the New York legislature
made it impossible for Pennsylvania's Liquor Control Board to
purchase liquor at a price lower than that paid by New York wholesalers for the same product. 68 At first glance, the New York statute
may appear to have no effect on the rights of Pennsylvania citizens
and the P.L.C.B. Closer analysis, however, reveals that there is
indeed an encroachment.
Stated generally, Pennsylvania is the largest single purchaser
of alcoholic beverages in the world. 9 Based on this fact alone,
61.
62.
63.
64.

See
See
See
See

text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes

65.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

52-55 supra.
54-59 supra.
203-07 infra.
52-55 supra.

66. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
67. N.Y. ALco. BEv. CONTROL § 101-b-3 (McKinney Supp. 1964).
68. See text accompanying notes 23-37 supra.
69. In 1970 the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board paid $256,323,132
for liquor. The closest competitor was the Alcoholic Beverage Control
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it appears logical to expect that the P.L.C.B. would receive substantial quantity discounts based on the substantial economic
weight associated with a major consumer. In addition to the sheer
volume of purchase are the facts of delivery to only a comparatively few warehouses, standardized order procedures, uniform billing procedures, etc.-all factors which result in a legitimate dollar
savings to the distiller in clerical, administrative, labor and transportation costs. When this situation is juxtaposed with that in
New York, for example, where orders originate with at least 175
separate wholesalers, 70 the fact of significant savings by sale to
one customer becomes obvious.
Thus, because of the New York statute 71 and similar affirmation practices in twenty-six other states, 72 the P.L.C.B. cannot bargain for reduced prices in any form, for even assuming that some
reduction were achieved, it must be immediately offered as well
to all affirmation states, thus ceasing to be a discount. In so restricting the P.L.C.B., New York is also similarly restricting each
Pennsylvania citizen in the exercise of a privilege given to him by
the twenty-first amendment-the privilege to purchase alcoholic
beverages to the extent permitted by Pennsylvania and federal
law. It has been suggested that such restriction constitutes a denial of the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United
States, thus being unconstitutional. 73 The remainder of this section of this Comment will deal with that suggestion.
An initial question to be resolved is whether New York's action is permissible under the twenty-first amendment, thus negating the effect of the privileges and immunities clause under the
theory that a restrictive constitutional amendment later in time
controls an earlier constitutional guarantee. 74 As discussed
Board of the State of Michigan, which paid $215,643,715 for liquor during
the same period. The Distilled Spirits Institute, Public Revenue from
Alocholic Beverages, 1970 (1971). It should be noted that this does not
indicate that the largest state market for alcoholic beverages is Pennsylvania. In 1971, California residents consumed 46,656,780 wine gallons of
alcoholic beverages and New York 43,332,962 wine gallons, while Pennsylvania residents consumed only 16,187,669 wine gallons. GAViN-JABsON,
TnE LIQUOR HMNBOOK 1972 (1972).
Because Pennsylvania is a control
state, however, only one purchaser was involved whereas New York and
California purchases were made by a large number of wholesalers.
70. GAVIN-JABsoN, THE LIQUOR HANDBOOK 1971 (1972) at 98. Figure
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971.
71. N.Y. ALco. BEv. CONTROL § 1l0-c-3 (McKinney Supp. 1964).
72. See note 15 supra.
73. See note 5 supra.
74. See Corneli v. Moore, 267 F. 456 (D.C. Mo.), aff'd, 257 U.S. 491
(1920) for a detailed discussion of this interesting and presumedly valid
constitutional theory.

above, 75 the twenty-first amendment conferred upon the states
plenary power with respect to the sale, consumption, transportation and manufacture of alcoholic beverages.76 New York apparently can therefore adopt any law or regulation reasonably designed to effectuate an expressed legislative purpose concerning the
sale, consumption, transportation and manufacture of alcoholic
beverages. 77 However, this plenary power was given to each state,
thus of necessity containing an inherent restriction that any such
statute be limited in effect to the confines of the state enacting it.
Thus, for example, Pennsylvania could not declare it to be illegal
for one of its citizens to consume alcoholic beverages while in New
York state, or to use an even more extreme example, declare it to
be illegal for any person to produce alcohol within fifty miles outside of its state borders. In essence, however, that is precisely8
what New York has done by enacting the affirmation statute.
In exercising its right under the twenty-first amendment, New
York has placed a direct limitation upon the exercise of identical
twenty-first amendment rights by Pennsylvania. Although this
effect appears to be clearly improper, it may not constitute a violation of the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, inter alia, that "[n] o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States .... ,,70 At the time of its proposal to the legislatures of the states by the Thirty-ninth Congress in June 13, 1866
and ratification on July 21, 1868, the fourteenth amendment and
the privileges and immunities clause in particular, was hailed as
a major source of new federal guarantees to the citizens of the various states. This concept of the clause was, however, short-lived.80
75. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
76. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
77. Id. See also note 55 supra.
78. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONTROL § 101-b-3 (McKinney Supp. 1964).
79. U.S. CoNsT. amend, XIV, § 1. It should be noted that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, can have no application to the situation under discussion. The equal
protection clause provides that "[N]o State shall .

.

. deny to any person

[Emphasis
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
added]. Inasmuch as neither Pennsylvania nor her citizens are persons
within New York's jurisdiction, the equal protection clause has no applicability.
80.

See P. HowARD, SELEcTrD EssAYs ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Book

2 (1938) at 402-24. The aim of the most aggressive sponsors of the clause
was to centralize in the hands of the federal government large powers
hitherto exercised by the states, with a view of enabling business to
develop unimpeded by state interference. This. expansive alteration of
the federal system was to have been achieved by converting the rights of
the citizens of each state into privileges and immunities of United States
Citizenship, which privileges were to be protected by the judiciary. The
United States Supreme Court noted these facts, and then rejected the
concept as not being the intent of Congress or the ratifying states. Cf.
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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After expressing a reluctance to delineate a definitive enumeration of those privileges and immunities of United States citizens which are protected against state encroachment, the Supreme
Court did, in the Slaughterhouse Cases,8 1 "suggest some [privileges
and immunities] which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.18 2 The
Court then identified the following: right of access to the seat of
Government, and to the seaports, subtreasuries, land offices, and
courts of justice in the several states; right to demand protection
of the federal government on the high seas, or abroad; right of
assembly and privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; right to use
the navigable waters of the United States; and rights secured by
83
treaty.
Another listing was offered thirty-five years later in Twining
v. New Jersey,8 4 where the Court recognized "among the rights
and privileges"85 of national citizenship the following: the right to
pass freely from state to state, 86 the right to petition Congress for a
redress of grievances,8 7 the right to vote for national officers, 88
the right to enter public lands,8 9 the right to be protected against
violence while in the lawful custody of a United States Marshall, 90
and the right to inform the United States authorities of violations
of its laws.9 1 In another decision, not referred to in Twining, the
Court acknowledged that the carrying on of interstate commerce
is a "right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to
exercise." 92
During more modern times, this clause has been accorded
somewhat uneven treatment by the Court,93 which has on at least
two occasions manifested a disposition to magnify the restraint
which it imposes on state action by enlarging previous enumera-

81. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
82. Id. at 79.
83. Id. at 79-80, citing Crandall v. Nevada, 75 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35
(1868), decided before ratification of the fourteenth amendment.
84. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
85. Id. at 97.
86. Id. citing Crandall v. Nevada, 75 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
87. Id. citing United States v. Cruikshauk, 82 U.S. 542 (1876).
88. Id. citing Ex Parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Wiley v.
Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
89. Id. citing United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
90. Id. citing Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
91. Id. citing In re Quarles and 'Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
92. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891).
93. See P.B. Kirkland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "It's
Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405 (1972).

tions of the privileges protected thereby. In Hague v. C.I.O.,94 the
Court held that freedom to use municipal streets and parks for the
dissemination of information concerning provisions of a federal
statute and to assemble peacefully therein for discussion of the
advantages and opportunities offered by the act were the privileges
and immunities of a United States citizen. The latter privilege
was deemed to have been abridged by city officials who acted in
pursuance of a void ordinance which authorized a director of safety
to refuse permits for parades or assemblies on streets or parks
whenever he believed riots could thereby be avoided and who forcibly evicted therefrom city union organizers who sought to use
the streets and parks for the aforementioned purposes. 95 Again
in Edwards v. California,"" four Justices, who concurred in the
judgment that a California statute restricting the entry of indigent
migrants was unconstitutional, preferred to rest their decision on
the ground that the act interfered with the rights of citizens to
move freely from state to state.9 7 In thus rejecting the commerce
clause relied on by the majority as the basis for disposing of this
case, the minority resurrected an issue first advanced in the old
decision of Crandall v. Nevada 98 and believed to have been resolved in favor of the commerce clause by Hilson v. Kentucky. 9
Colgate v. Harvey,10 0 however, which was decided in 1935 and
overruled in 1940,101 represented the first attempt by the court
since adoption of the fourteenth amendment to convert the privileges and immunities clause into a source of protection for other
than those "interests growing out of the relationship between the
citizen and the natural government."102 Here the Court declared
that the right of a citizen, resident in one state, to contract in
another, to transact any lawful business, or to make a loan of
money, in any state other than that in which the citizen resides
was a privilege of national citizenship which was abridged by a
state income tax law excluding from taxable income interest received on money loaned with the state.108
94. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
95. Concurring in the result, Mr. Justice Stone argued that the case
should have been disposed of by relying upon the due process clause,
rather than the privileges and immunities clause inasmuch as the record
disclosed that the complainants had not invoked the latter clause and the
evidence failed to indicate that any of the complainants were in fact
United States citizens or that any relation between citizens and the federal
government was involved. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 525-27 (1939)
(concurring opinion).
96. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
97. Id. at 177-83 (Douglas, Black, Murphy and Jackson, JJ, concurring).
98. 75 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
99.

279 U.S. 245, 251 (1929).

100. 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
101. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
102. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 444 (1935).
103. Id. at 445-46.
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Whether or not this repudiated concept is again to be revived
and the privileges and immunities clause again placed in readiness
1 04
for further expansion cannot yet be determined with assurance.
°5
However, in Oyama v. California' the Court, in a single sentence,
affirmed the contention of a native-born youth, that California's
Alien Land Law as applied to him deprived him "of his privileges
as an American citizen, in that it worked a forfeiture of property
purchased in his name with funds advanced by his parent, who
was a Japanese alien ineligible for citizenship and precluded from
owning land by the terms of the statute. 06
In 1963 the Supreme Court again considered a privileges and
immunities argument in Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners
in Optometry.l07 Petitioner here claimed that a New Mexico statute which forbade the advertising of eyeglass prices and thereby
prohibited her newspaper from dealing with a Texas optometrist,
violated her privileges and immunities of national citizenship.
The Court disposed of this argument in a footnote, stating that
"the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a naked right to conduct a business free of
otherwise valid state regulation."' 08
In 1969, the Court in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham'0 9
was given an opportunity to clarify the position stated in Hague v.
C.I.O.10 some thirty years earlier. In that case, very similar on its
facts to Hague, the defendant was convicted of violating a city ordinance making it illegal to participate in any parade, procession, or
other public demonstration without first obtaining a permit from
the city commission. The Court reaffirmed Hague, quoting at
length therefrom: "Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights and liberties of citizens. . . ."I" The Court concluded that
although the right could be state regulated, it could not be abused
without violating those privileges and immunities. 1 2 Thus in revitalizing the long-dormant and beclouded Hague doctrine, the
Court appears to have firmly committed itself to employing the
104. See P.B. Kirkland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "It's
Hour Come Round at Last"? 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405 (1972).
105. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
106. Id. at 640.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

374 U.S. 424 (1963).
Id. at 432 n.12.
394 U.S. 147 (1969).
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969).
Id.

privileges and immunities clause as a means of insuring at least
first amendment rights to the general citizenry, perhaps portending a more active future role for that clause.
The Court's most recent consideration of the privileges and
immunities clause came in 1971 in James v. Valtierra.113 There
petitioners challenged a California constitutional'" provision
requiring community referendum approval prior to the building
of low cost housing, asserting that the provisions denied them
their right to federally-funded low cost housing, a right protected,
inter alia, by the privileges and immunities clause. The Court
disposed of the contention in one sentence, stating simply that
"We also find the privileges and immunities argument without
merit."115
Federal and Supreme Court decisions regarding alcoholic beverages have never upheld a privileges and immunities argument.
The most recent such case arose in 1963. That case, American
Travelers Club, Inc. v. Hostetter,"6 decided by a New York District Court, involved a New York Liquor Authority bulletin
which in effect precluded plaintiff from conducting a rather complicated business whereby liquor orders mailed from outside the
United States were solicited, filled in Holland, declared by returning American tourists as "following baggage," and delivered to
them in New York. The Court found no violation of the privileges
and immunities clause.
Prior to prohibition, the Supreme Court considered state limitation on the sale of alcoholic beverages on several occasions. In
each instance, after reviewing the Slaughterhouse limitation that
only privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and essential character of the national government and granted or secured
by the Constitution of the United States fall within the protection
of the clause, 1 7 the Court found the right to sell alcoholic beverages to fall outside the sphere of such protection."18 It should,
however, be noted that in each instance the limitation effected
only activity within the confines of the state." 9 State courts have
unanimously arrived at similar conclusions regarding the sale of
20
alcoholic beverages.

113. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
114. CAL. CONST. Art. XXXIV.

115.
116.
117.
U.S. 91

James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140 (1971).
219 F. Supp. 95 (D.C.N.Y. 1963).
Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 661 (1893); Crowley v. Christensen, 137
(1890); Mulger v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 657 (1887); Bartemeyer v. Iowa,

18 Wall. 138 (1874); Busch v. Webb, 122 F. 655 (C.C. Tex. 1903), appeal
dismissed, 194 U.S. 640 (1903).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Sepe v. Daneker, 76 R.I. 160, 68 A.2d 101 (1949); Silberglied v.
Mulrooney, 150 Misc. 251, 270 N.Y.S. 290 (1934). See also Wylie v. State
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IV.

CONCLUSION AS TO PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNrriS

In light of the historical application of the privileges and immunities clause, especially as applied to liquor, it appears unlikely
that any future affirmation argument by Pennsylvania based
thereon will receive more than cursory treatment by the United
States Supreme Court. A possibility of success does, however, exist, especially in light of two factors. The first and probably less
important of these is the possibility of an expanded role being
judicially assigned to the historically all-but-ignored privileges
worthy of note in the 1948 decision that the right to hold property
falls within the privileges and immunities clause. 121 Also the
Court's 1969 reaffirmation of the long dormant Hague rationale,
employing the privileges and immunities clause as a vehicle for
extending certain first amendment rights to override conflicting
122
state law may portend such an extension.
Even if the Court is unwilling to so extend the doctrine, however, solid ground appears to exist for a favorable decision. The
controlling criterion for the application of the privileges and immunities clause still appears to be that the interest asserted be a
privilege or immunity arising out of the nature and essential character of the national government and granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States. 123 According to this language,
Pennsylvania need show only two things to invoke the protection
of the privileges and immunities clause: (1) That the purchase of
alcoholic beverages at the best price possible, as limited by her own
and federal statutes, is a privilege arising out of the nature and
essential character of the federal government, granted or secured
by the Constitution; and (2) that such privilege has been unreasonably infringed upon.
As to the first requirement, the argument is complex but apparently logically sound. Initially, although the privilege of purchasing alcoholic beverages may not have originally been a federal
guarantee, revocation of that privilege and subsequent restoration
through the medium of constitutional amendment apparently
raised it to the level of a constitutional guarantee of each United
States citizen as limited by the state within whose jurisdiction he
Bd, of Equalization, 21 F. Supp. 604 (D.C. Cal. 1938); Marks v. Bruckman,
170 Misc. 709, 9 N.Y.S. 947 (1937); Utah Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Stewart, 82 Utah
198, 23 P.2d 229 (1933); Beacon Liquors v. Martin, 279 Ky. 468, 151 S.W.2d
446 (1929); McClure v. Topf, 112 Ark. 342, 166 S.W. 174 (1914).
121. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
122 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
See
text accompanying notes 94-95 and 109-12 supra.
123. Compare Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
with Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).

stands. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed privilege may vary
from absolute freedom to absolute prohibition as the citizen passes
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the constitution guarantees
that the federal government will enforce the degree of freedom or
restraint chosen by each state. 124 Second a citizen of the United
States has the privilege of seeking and receiving the lowest price
on any item purchased that is permissible under federal law and
the law of the state wherein he stands. 25 Pennsylvania citizens
have delegated this privilege as to liquor purchases to the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. 126 The first requirement for invoking the protection of the privileges and immunities clause is
thus met.
Fulfilling the second requirement is relatively simple. Pennsylvania need only point to the New York affirmation statute itself, which prohibits her from obtaining liquor at a price lower
than that received by New York, and then demonstrate that due
to reduced costs on the part of the manufacturer, quantity dis12
counts would be forthcoming but for the New York restriction.
The final element to be pointed out is that, although New York has
the absolute privilege to condition the sale of alcoholic beverages
within her own jurisdiction as she sees fit, when the effect of exercising that privilege is to infringe upon the exercise by Pennsylvania of an identical privilege, an unreasonable encroachment results.

128

Despite the apparent logical soundness of this argument, however, probabilities of future success seem small. To achieve acceptance, Pennsylvania would have to persuade the United States
Supreme Court to extend recognition to a portion of the Constitution which, although apparently properly applicable, has certainly
not been a favorite with the Court. There appears little to indicate
that the Court considers this point in history to be a proper
time for such extension.
V. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT

The extent to which the twenty-first amendment overrides
the federal government powers granted by the commerce clause is
the primary consideration in the determination of whether affirmation agreements are constitutional. The commerce clause empowers the federal government to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.' 1

29

Because affirmation agreements place restrictions on

124. See text accompanying notes 43-61 supra.
125. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
129. U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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the sale of alcoholic beverages, it is necessary to consider the extent of a state's power over liquor in light of the commerce clause.
The first case is to consider the conflict between the twentyfirst amendment and the commerce clause was State Board of
Equalization v. Young's Market Co.' 30 In that case a five-hundred
dollar license fee to import beer imposed by California was under
consideration. Since this fee obviously offended the freedom of
interstate commerce in beer,'3 1 the twenty-first amendment and
the commerce clause conflicted. The Court addressed this conflict
by finding:
The Amendment which "prohibited" the transportation
or importation of intoxicating liquors into any state "in
violation of the laws," abrogated the13right
to import free,
2
so far as concerns intoxicating liquors.
All subsequent cases concerning restrictions placed on the sale
or use of intoxicants strictly within the specific state's borders
have been upheld. The twenty-first amendment has been used
to uphold a state regulation forcing registration of imported liquor
with the United States Patent Office, 3 3 a statute forbidding instate beer distributors from purchasing beer from any state which
discriminates against home state manufacturers, 3 4 a state statute
limiting transportation of intoxicating liquors to common carriers, 3 5 a state statute imposing minimum prices on retailers, 136 a
prohibition against citizens of other states from transporting liquor
through the state in question, 37 a prohibition against soliciting
liquor sales in-state by unlicensed nonresidents" 38 and finally a
state statute prohibiting female bartenders in certain areas.'3 9
The foregoing cases all involve intrastate controls. The twenty-first amendment by its own terms is limited in applicability
130. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
131. What the plaintiffs complain of is the refusal to let them
import beer without paying for the privilege of importation.
Prior to the Twenty-first Amendment it would obviously have
been unconstitutional to have imposed any fee for that privilege.
The imposition would have been void, not because it resulted in
discrimination, but because the fee would be a direct burden on
interstate commerce....
Id. at 62.
132. Id.
133. Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
134. Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S.
391 (1939); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939).
135. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
136. Schwartz v. Kelly, 140 Conn. 177, 99 A.2d 89 (1953).
137. Wylie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 21 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Cal.
1937).
138. House of York LTD. v. Reng, 322 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
139. Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

to such circumstances.1 40 Because affirmation statutes involve
intrastate controls over intoxicating liquors with interstate effects,
it is necessary to examine cases in which the courts have determined that the powers granted by the twenty-first amendment
have been exceeded.
A. Limitations on State Twenty-first Amendment Powers
In Hostetter v. Idlewild,141 the state of New York attempted
to have defendant's practice of purchasing liquor outside New
York for sale to international travelers at Idlewild Airport declared illegal. The Supreme Court in defining New York's twentyfirst amendment power held:
This Court made clear in the early years following
adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment that by virtue of
its provisions a State is totally unconfined by traditional
Commerce Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined
142 for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders.
Concluding that these circumstances do not involve "intoxicants
destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders,"
the Court indicated:
Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce
Clause are parts of the same Constitution. Like other
provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in
the light of the other, and in the context
of the issues and
143
interests at stake in any concrete case.
Other circumstances in which the courts have found that state
controls over liquor are not sanctioned by the twenty-first amendment because of extraterritorial effects include the following:
state attempts to prevent the shipment of liquor through its territory for consumption in a national park located therein; 144 an
attempt by New Jersey to impose its liquor licensing requirements
upon owners of liquor contained in vessels docked at New Jersey
ports; 145 and an attempt to place restrictions on liquor being
46
shipped through a state.

The above cases in which the commerce clause was given application in spite of the twenty-first amendment all involved circumstances of attempted liquor control where the liquor involved
140. The twenty-first amendment is limited in applicability to situations
in which the intoxicating liquor is "delivered or used" in the state. See
text accompanying notes 144-46 infra.

141. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).

142. Id. at 330.
143. Id. at 332.
144. Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1939).
145. Epstein v. Lordi, 261 F. Supp. 921 (D.C.N.J. 1966). See also
Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distillery Co., 377 U.S. 341
(1964) in which the Supreme Court found that a state had no power under
the twenty-first amendment to impose an import tax on liquor in sealed
containers prior to resale or use by the importers in the state.
146. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944); Motor Cargo v. Division
of Tax Appeals, 10 N.J. 585, 92 A.2d 774 (1952).
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was not for "delivery or use therein." 147 The affirmation statutes
here under consideration regulate liquor for delivery or use in the
state imposing the restriction. However, the restriction, it is contended, has extraterritorial effects. Thus, when New York passes
its affirmation statute it effectively prohibits the state of Pennsylvania from bargaining for quantity purchase price discounts.
It is clear that the twenty-first amendment cannot be applied to
sanction state controls over liquor for use outside its borders. 148
Based on this finding, it is submitted that any state liquor controls,
in this case affirmation laws, which effectively regulate the price
at which liquor can be purchased by other states exceeds twentyfirst amendment powers.
Several Supreme Court decisions imply that any use of twenty-first amendment powers having effect outside state borders fall
because of the commerce clause. In United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries,149 producers, wholesalers and retailers of liquor were
indicted under the Sherman Act for alleged price fixing of liquor.
When the defendants argued that the twenty-first amendment prevented interference by the federal govermment the Supreme Court
responded:
It is argued that the Twenty-first Amendment to the
Constitution bars this prosecution. That Amendment bestowed upon the states broad regulatory power over the
liquor traffic within their territories. It has not given the
states plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct
of persons doing an interstate liquor business outside their
boundaries. 1 0
This holding is surprising for several reasons. First, it recognizes
that price fixing within a state has interstate effects. Second it
recognizes that the states have the power to regulate the conduct
of persons doing an interstate business although this state power
is not to the exclusion of federal control over interstate commerce.
Several other cases have also recognized the right of the federal government, through use of the commerce clause, to prohibit
price conspiracies in the sale of intoxicating liquors. 151 However,
147. See note 140 supra.
148. See notes 144-46 and accompanying text supra.
149. 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
150. Id. at 299.
151. See Washington Brewers Institute v. United States, 137 F.2d 964
(9th Cir. 1943); Chapiewsky v. 6 Heileman Brewing Co., 297 F. Supp. 33
(W.D. Wis. 1968); Schenley Industries, Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit
Wholesalers Ass'n., 272 F. Supp. 872 (D.C.N.J. 1967); United States v.
Maryland State Licensed Beverage Ass'n., 138 F. Supp. 685 (D.C. Md.

where the state itself has adopted the price fixing policy under
scrutiny the twenty-first amendment prevents federal government
intervention. Thus, in Schenley Industries, Inc. v. New Jersey
Wine and Spirit Wholesalers Association,1 2 when an outside manufacturer contested price fixing by New Jersey manufacturers the
court found: "[u]nless a State has affirmatively adopted a policy
of price fixing by private groups, such action is not protected by
the twenty-first amendment." 153 This holding indicates that in
spite of the interstate effect of price fixing, where the state authorizes such fixed prices the action is within twenty-first amend154
ment powers.
Interstate effects of the exercise of a twenty-first amendment
power are not alone sufficient to invalidate a use of that power.
In two cases' 55 the courts have been faced with the question of
whether affirmation laws affect interstate commerce to such an
extent that they fall outside powers given the states over intoxicating liquors by the twenty-first amendment. Both cases involved
the potential effect of affirmation laws on liquor prices in other
states. The argument raised in these two cases was that since
manufacturers were presently obtaining minimum profits in New
York and Kansas there was no possibility of lowering prices in
these states to comply with the affirmation law which requires
that New York and Kansas wholesalers be given the lowest price
charged anywhere in the country. The manufacturers, Seagrams
and Laird, argued that the lower prices received in certain other
states were the result of lower selling, clerical and transportation
expenses there, which resulted from the fact that the state itself is
the purchaser in these states. Thus, there is only one shipment
point, one sale to consummate, one bill to type up and no collection problem. To comply with these affirmation laws the manufacturers argued that liquor prices would of necessity be raised in
these other states rather than lowered in New York or Kansas.
Finally, these manufacturers argued that this form of interstate
interference, unlike state price fixing, has substantial effects on
interstate commerce and is therefore unprotected by the twentyfirst amendment.
In considering this unique argument of interference with interstate commerce the Supreme Court in Joseph E. Seagrams &
Sons v. Hostetterstated:
We need not now decide whether the mode of liquor regulation chosen by a state in such circumstances could ever
constitute so grave an interference with a company's op1956); United States v. Colorado Wholesale Wine & Liquor Dealers Ass'n.
47 F. Supp. 160 (D.C. Colo. 1942).
152. 272 F. Supp. 872 (D.C.N.J. 1967).
153. Id. at 879.
154. See notes 133-40 and accompanying text supra.
155. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966); Laird
& Co. v. J.R. Cheney, 196 Kan. 675, 414 P.2d 18 (1966).
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erations elsewhere as to
156 make the regulation invalid under
the Commerce Clause.
The Court felt that whether such discrimination would result was
pure conjecture subject to: review at a later date. The Court
found:
The serious discriminatory effects of § 9 alleged by appellants on their business outside New York are largely matters of conjecture. It is by no means clear, for instance,
that § 9 must inevitably produce higher prices in other
states, as claimed, by appellants, rather than the lower
prices sought for New York. It will be time enough to
assess the alleged extraterritorial effects
of § 9 when a
157
case arises that clearly presents them.
This case is therefore extremely significant since it recognized
that affirmation laws, if sufficient factual support is presented,
might amount to excessive use of twenty-first amendment powers.
It also envisions the possibility that, although "affirmation laws"
appear to be intrastate in effect and hence within the protection of
the twenty-first amendment, such laws could be in violation of the
commerce clause. It is clear that proof of a significant interference with liquor prices in other states would result in the invalidation of both New York's and Kansas' affirmation laws.
However, neither of these cases present criteria for determining what constitutes a sufficient interference with interstate commerce. If we presume that some interference with interstate commerce can be shown to have resulted from the New York and Kansas affirmation laws, we can then examine the commerce clause
and the case law interpreting what acts are sufficient to constitute
a violation thereof. In considering any state law which indirectly
affects the commerce of the country, it must be remembered that
the commerce clause was not intended to prevent the states from
passing such legislation if in the interest of the health, life or safety
of their citizens. 158 State statutes for the protection of state citizens and indirectly affecting interstate commerce are especially
prevalent in the field of transportation. Thus, a South Carolina
statute limiting the weight and width of vehicles using its highways clearly interfered with interstate commerce, yet the Supreme Court upheld it. The Court indicated:
In the absence of national legislation especially covering
the subject of interstate commerce, the State may rightly
prescribe uniform regulations adopted to promote safety
upon its highways and the conservation of their use, ap156. 384 U.S. at 42-43.
157.

Id. at 45.

158. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
also Hoopstein Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).

See

plicable alike to vehicles moving
in interstate commerce
159
and those of its own citizens.
This power to interfere with interstate commerce in the interest of
protecting citizenry, however, is not without limits. In Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 60 an Illinois statute required special rear
fender mud guards on trucks traveling on its highways. The statute was struck down by the Supreme Court which declared: "This
is one of those cases-few in number-where local safety measures
that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on
1 61
interstate commerce. "
Although the twenty-first amendment was drafted in a manner which enabled the states to maintain maximum control over
liquor due to the adverse effects alcohol can cause, it would be difficult to argue that affirmation laws are passed with any intention
of protecting the health or safety of state citizens. Such a purpose
would be an effective defense to any charge of interference with
interstate commerce but no such defense exists. The sole purpose of affirmation laws is to decrease the price paid for liquor by
state wholesalers and retailers thus reducing consumer prices and
making liquor more easily obtainable. Accomplishment of this
purpose increases rather than decreases the dangers inherent in
liquor.
A second consideration of whether an affirmation law violates
the commerce clause is the extent to which it interferes with interstate commerce. In California v. Thompson,16 2 the validity of a
California statute requiring transportation agents engaged in business in California to post a bond and obtain a license to conduct
this business was upheld. The Supreme Court presented the following criteria in considering the legality of a state statute which
interferes with interstate commerce:
As this Court has often had occasion to point out, the
Commerce Clause, in conferring on Congress power to
regulate commerce, did not wholly withdraw from the
states the power to regulate matters of local concern with
respect to which Congress has not exercised its power even
though the regulation affects interstate commerce....
Because of their local character, also, there is wide scope
for local regulation without impairing the uniformity of
control of the national commerce in matters of national
concern and without materially obstructing the free flow
of commerce which were the principal
objects sought to be
16 3
secured by the Commerce Clause.
This case can be distinguished from the affirmation law action in
that the California statute was for the protection of its citizens
159.
177, 189
160.
161.
162.
163.

South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
(1938), quoting Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143 (1927).
359 U.S. 520 (1959).
Id. at 529.
313 U.S. 109 (1941).
Id. at 113.
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whereas the affirmation. statutes are not. However, there are also
similarities. Both the California statute and affirmation statutes
regulate matters of local concern. Also, it could be argued that an
affirmation statute is for the protection of citizens, its purpose
being to enable citizens to obtain decreased liquor prices. The
test which is established in California v. Thompson, assuming the
flow of liquor is not a matter of national concern, is whether the
barrier imposed materially affects the free flow of commerce.
Whether or not the affirmation statutes materially affect the free
flow of liquor is a subjective test to be applied to the price information supplied.
Of final consideration is the purpose of affirmation lawseconomic benefit to the state passing the law. In Hood & Sons v.
Du Mond, 64 a distributor of milk located in Massachusetts and
operating three receiving plants in New York applied for a license
for an additional New York plant. New York rejected the application contending the new plant would reduce the supply of milk
from local markets. Regarding an interference with interstate
commerce for state economic benefit, the Court held:
This Court consistently has rebuffed attempts of states to
advance their own commercial interests by curtailing the
movement of articles in commerce, either into or out of the
state while generally supporting their right to impose even
burdensome
regulations in the interest of local health and
16 5
safety.
On the specific question of promoting economic benefits within
the state, the Court in Hood & Sons v. Du Mond held "that the
State may not promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce."' 166 Since the affirmation statutes are enacted for state economic benefit and since there
is no defense that these statutes are passed in the interest of
health and safety of citizens, it is submitted that they are in violation of the commerce clause. If sufficient interference with interstate commerce is shown, the twenty-first amendment is inapplicable since the state has exceeded its powers. Therefore, a state
statute, the affirmation law, is in conflict with a federal constitutional provision, the commerce clause. Where such conflicts arise
the supremacy clause 67 is applied. The result is that the state
164.
165.
(1935).
166.

336 U.S. 525 (1949).
Id. at 535. See also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
336 U.S. at 532.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the

167.

legislation is struck down as unconstitutional.1

68

VI. ARGUABLE ATTACKS oN AFFRnVATIoN UNDER
Tm SHEmVt ACT
Another possibility of action by the state of Pennsylvania
against other affirmation states exists in use of the Sherman Act
which provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal .... 119
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States ....

A.

170

State Action as a Violation of the Sherman Act

Before considering the manner in which the affirmation states
may have violated the Sherman Act, it is necessary to examine
whether the Act may be applied against state actions. In determining whether a state may be found in violation of the Sherman
Act, one must also consider the effect of the twenty-first amendment which grants to the states broad regulatory powers. In
Washington Brewers Institute v. United States,171 the court, considering the applicability of the Sherman Act to the liquor industry in light of the twenty-first amendment, indicated:
Thus the broad theory of the Sherman Act-that trade
should be free of artificial restraints-is in many respects
incompatible with the policy of state liquor-control legislation; and wherever such conflicts exist the Sherman Act
must give way, just as the commerce
clause itself gives
72
way in identical circumstances.1
Thus, the point of inquiry turns to the circumstances under which
the commerce clause overrides the twenty-first amendment. 173 In
Beckanstin v. Liquor Control Commission,174 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that state legislation directing wholesalers to fix
and maintain prices to retailers of liquor which had been transported in interstate commerce was within the powers granted by
the twenty-first amendment and not subject to Sherman Act restrictions.
Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state should
be bound thereby, and nothing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.
168. See Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Buck v. KyKendall,
267 U.S. 307 (1925).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1961).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1961).
171. 137 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1943).
172. Id. at 968.
173. See notes 140-47 and accompanying text supra.
174. 140 Conn. 185, 99 A.2d 119 (1953).
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The case of Chapiewsky v. G. Heilman Brewing Co.175 held
that the Sherman Act could be applicable to transactions involving
liquor. The court there indicated:
It is well established, however, that the Sherman Act is
not limited to transactions in interstate commerce, but extends to intrastate
transactions, which affect interstate
176
commerce.
Chapiewsky is significant because it applied the Sherman Act to an
interstate pricing arrangement between distributors and a brewer
of beer. However, since the case did not concern a state regulation, no conflict arose between the twenty-first amendment and the
Sherman Act. United States v. Colorado Wholesaler Wine and Liquor Dealers Association,'7" presenting a factual situation similar
to that dealt with in Chapiewsky, involved a conspiracy to set
prices in the state of Colorado. Although again there was no direct
conflict between the twenty-first amendment and the Sherman
Act, the language used by the court implied that the Sherman Act
would prevail:
We cannot agree that by the 21st Amendment to the Constitution liquor was removed from interstate commerce, or
that jurisdiction over it was thereby vested exclusively in
the several states, nor that the said Amendment gave the
individual states control over intoxicating liquor within
their respective borders, with supreme jurisdiction to regulate or limit the sale thereof, without violating the Commerce
Clause of the Federal Constitution and the Sherman
178
Act.
This quote, however, must be read in light of the facts of the case.
The price conspirators had alleged in defense that the twenty-first
amendment prevented intervention of the federal government
through use of the commerce clause. The court would not permit
such a defense to the Sherman Act. Whether the court intended
to place the commerce clause in a position superior to the twentyfirst amendment is uncertain. However, Joseph E. Seagrams &
Sons v.Hostetter'79 involved an action by several liquor manufacturers against New York's affirmation statute. Although violation
of the Sherman Act was contended by the appellants, the argument
was rejected. However, the Court indicated that "[n]othing in
the Twenty-first Amendment, of course would prevent enforcement of the Sherman Act against such a conspiracy."' 8 0 In a cir175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

297 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
Id. at 37.
47 F. Supp. 160 (D.C. Colo. 1942).
Id. at 162.
384 U.S. 35 (1960).
Id. at 46.

cumstance of sufficient factual proof the twenty-first amendment
does not bar a suit under the Sherman Act against a state's affirmation law if the Hostetter holding is followed.
The next consideration is whether Pennsylvania has standing
to bring such a suit. To maintain such an action there must be
some reasonable basis upon which Pennsylvania can claim direct
or indirect harm resulting from another state's affirmation policy.
This reasonable basis could be any of the following: the New York
statute operates as a restraint of trade preventing Pennsylvania
from bargaining for quantity price discounts; the New York statute
imposes an artificial barrier upon potential competitors effectively
preventing competitive price discounts; New York is part of a combination which through data dissemination intended to and has restrained trade; and finally New York is part of price fixing combinations.
B. Affirmation Agreements Resulting in a Combination within
the Meaning of the Sherman Act
A factual analysis of the operation of affirmation in the liquor
industry is essential to an evaluation of whether affirmation agreements constitute combinations which result in trade restraints.
As previously indicated affirmation agreements require manufacturers to guarantee that the price a state is paying for its liquor
is the lowest price charged anywhere in the country. In order to
assure conformance with affirmation requirements the National
Alcoholic Beverage Control Association [N.A.B.C.A.] was formed.
N.A.B.C.A. distributes price information to all the member states
(consisting of the affirmation states). The liquor manufacturers
are "associate members" of the Association and provide the Association with required price information. For purposes of analysis of potential Sherman Act violations, it will be assumed that it
can be proven that these liquor manufacturers, through the Association, acquire current price information of all other manufacturers through the N.A.B.C.A.
Whether the exchange of such price information constitutes a
Sherman Act violation by the manufacturers will now be considered. The earliest Supreme Court case involving distributions of
trade information was American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States.'81 In this case the members of a lumber manufacturing
association exchanged detailed information concerning sales, inventory, views of the market, and prices charged in recent prior sales.
The Court found, in the detailed information disseminated, a purpose of procuring harmonious individual actions. Although no specific agreement of price fixing existed the Court found an implied
agreement in the information exchanged and held the members
guilty of restraining interstate commerce. In United States v.
181.

257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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American Linseed Oil Co.,182 there was again a system for the
dissemination of intimate business information through a central
agency to all members. Schedules of prices and terms of sale
were among the data supplied. The Court found this information
was clearly aimed at discouraging independent decision by trade
rivals. It should be emphasized that in both American Column
and Linseed Oil the Court looked to the anti-competitive results of
exchanging information in finding Sherman Act violations.
In Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United
States,188 an association gathered and distributed statistical information among its members. The Court emphasized that "it is
neither alleged nor proved that there was any agreement among
the members of the association either affecting production, fixing
prices or for price maintenance."'184 The Court went on to point
out that the evidence failed to establish the maintenance of price
uniformity. Rejecting the notion that dissemination of information between competitors is a per se violation of the Sherman Act,
the Court held:
Whether, however, their general purpose was to become
law-abiding members of the community or law breakers,
it is not, we think, very material unless the court either
can infer from the course of conduct a specific and continuing purpose or agreement or understanding on their part
to do acts tending to effect an actual restraint of commerce,

. .

. or unless, on the other hand it is established

that the combination entered into by the defendants in the
organization of the defendant Association, and its activities
as now185carried on, must necessarily result in such restraint.
The Court found no violation since there was no inference of an
intent to restrain nor any indication that the dissemination must
result in such a restraint; nor could the court find any evil in the
mere dissemination of information. In fact, the Court indicated
that "[c] ompetition does not become less free merely because the
conduct of commercial operation becomes more intelligent through
the free distribution of knowledge of all the essential factors entering into the commercial transaction."' 86 The practice of dissemination of business information with no indication of an intent
182.
183.

262 U.S. 371 (1923).
268 U.S. 563 (1925).

184. Id. at 567.
185. Id. at 577.
251 U.S. 417 (1920).

See also United States v. United States Steel Corp.,

186. Id. at 583. The primary distinguishing factors between the Maple
Flooring and American Column cases lies in the fact that the latter dealt
with dissemination of specific price information and an element of coercion
whereas the former case contained neither of these criteria.

to restrain commerce through improper use of the information was
felt to be a sound and worthwhile business practice.
Since the Maple Flooring case, the Supreme Court and the
federal district and circuit courts have placed limitations on the
"valid business purpose" defense in data dissemination cases. In
Sugar Institute v. United States, 187 several sugar refiners formed
an association which established a price reporting plan. When
one seller announced an increase, buyers were given a short waiting period during which they could purchase sugar at the former
price. If other sellers failed to follow with their own increases
the leader was forced to rescind since sugar is a completely
standardized commodity. The Court found a Sherman Act violation not because of any concert to maintain a particular price, but
rather because of an agreement which the members entered into
that: "All discriminations between customers should be abolished.
To that end, sugar should be sold only upon open prices and terms
publicly announced."188 Once a price was accepted by all sellers,
thereafter none had the right to deviate from it. The defendants
attempted to defend their position using the good business purpose argument. "Having adopted the principle of open prices and
terms, without discrimination among customers, as the means of
remedying the evils of the secret concession system, the defendants lived up to the principle."' 189 The defendants thereby argued
that these price controls were in the best interests of all concerned. To this argument the Court responded:
[T]he number of price changes for refined as compared to
raw sugar had been relatively less since the Institute than
before. This was "too marked to be explained by the drop
in raw prices." There was a "marked increase in margin
and a substantial increase in profits" despite a concededly
large excess capacity. 90
The Court, by looking to the effects, rejected the business purpose
argument for disseminating information.
The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning the application of the Sherman Act to price dissemination among competitors is United States v. Container Corporation of America.'
In
this case there was no agreement to adhere to a price schedule as
existed in Sugar Institute v. United States. All that was present
was a request of each defendant for its most recent price charged
whenever such information was needed and was not available from
another source. The Container Corporation case can also be distinguished from the American Column and American Linseed Oil
cases since in those cases detailed reports of business information
were furnished to all competitors, whereas here only information
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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U.S. 553 (1936).
at 579.
at 582.
at 583.
U.S. 333 (1969).
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from a specific competitor regarding specific sales was exchanged.
Evidence elicited during the case showed that "[t]he result of this
reciprocal exchange of prices was to stabilize prices though at a
downward level. Knowledge of a competitor's price usually meant
matching that price."'102 It is important to recognize that the majority based its decision on an actual finding of price stabilization,
since this implies that the Supreme Court is not willing to conclude
that price data dissemination itself is unlawful per se.
Lower federal courts have tended more toward finding per se
violations of the Sherman Act for data dissemination than has the
Supreme Court. Thus in Plymouth Dealers Association v. United
States,19' it was held that the act of an automobile dealer association in printing and publishing a price list and circulating it among
its members violated the Sherman Act. The association contended
that mere data dissemination without more cannot constitute a
Sherman Act violation. Rejecting this argument, the court stated:
[0] nce the agreement to fix a price is made, it is conclusively presumed that a conspiracy to restrain trade exists,
and it is immaterial whether the agreements were ever
actually carried out, whether the purpose of the conspiracy was accomplished in whole or in part, or whether an
effort was 194
made to carry out the object of the conspiracy
into effect.
This result is really in conformance with Supreme Court statements on the subject that if an agreement to fix prices can be
found there is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 95 But it
must be remembered that data dissemination cases can never be
truly per se violations since in a data dissemination case the dissemination must be shown to constitute a conspiracy or agreement
to fix prices.
96
it
In United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Association,
was held that a pharmaceutical association was engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices in unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce, when its officers and directors distributed a price schedule
for prescription drugs. Members were induced to use the schedule
though no agreement existed. It should be noted that the court
. 192. Id. at 336-37. The court indicated that the mere limitation of
price competition resulting from the agreement was sufficient to constitute
a Sherman Act violation since it was held in United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) that any interference with the setting
of price through free market forces is unlawful per se.
193. 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
194. Id. at 132. See also Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n v.
United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1962).
195. See text accompanying notes 184-88 supra.
196. 201 F. Supp. 29 (D.C. Utah), appeal dismissed, 306 F.2d 493, aff'd,
371 U.S.24 (1962).

made a definite finding that the price lists were distributed with
the intent of inducing association members to conform to the suggested prices. The court added that "with such adoption, publication and distribution shown, no proof would be necessary if an intent to fix prices or an agreement to adhere thereto" 197 was established.
All the data dissemination cases examined required something
in addition to mere dissemination to prove a Sherman Act violation. Some of the cases found actual market price stabilization
effects1 98 sufficient, whereas others based the violation on a finding of an actual agreement or intent to fix prices. 199
To prove a Sherman Act violation based on price dissemination among liquor manufacturers, Pennsylvania would have to
prove that: (1) Prices are disseminated among the manufacturers;
and (2) these price disseminations in fact affected prices 200 or
there is proof of an agreement or intent to affect prices. Once a
violation of the Sherman Act by the liquor manufactures is
shown it is necessary to prove that the affirmation states are themselves involved in the conspiracy or combination restraining trade.
In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 20 ' a newspaper granted exclusive territorial routes to 172 carriers provided these carriers abided by
maximum suggested retail prices. Plaintiff in this case raised his
price above the maximum. The defendant publisher then hired
Milne Circulation Sales, Inc. to solicit plaintiff's customers to direct delivery by one George Kroner. The new carrier was aware of
the Albrecht conflict. The Court found that "there can be no
doubt that a combination arose between respondent, Milne, and
Kroner to force petitioner to conform to the advertised retail
price. ' 20 2 In finding this combination the Court noted that both
Milne and Kroner were aware of defendant's purpose. Although
no agreement, implied or express, was present in Albrecht, the
court found the restraint itself was sufficient to prove the combination in violation of the Sherman Act.
This lack of agreement also exists in the situation here considered. The states were involved in no agreement with the manufacturers restraining trade of liquor. However, a restraint re197. Id. at 35. It is clear however that the court in Utah Pharmaceutical found an implied agreement to adhere.
198. See notes 181, 182, 191 and 192 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 183, 184, 188, 194 and 197 and accompanying text supra.
200. See note 192 supra. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) the Court announced:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often

is formed without simultaneous action or agreement on the part

of the conspirators ....
Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the

necessary consequence of which if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy
under the Sherman Act.

201.

390 U.S. 145 (1968).

202. Id. at 149.
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sulted. To prove the involvement of the affirmation states in
this restraint of trade, Pennsylvania must show:
1. The price list distributions to the manufacturers resulted in price control over the free market exercised
by these manufacturers.
2. The affirmation states were aware the price lists were
being distributed to the manufacturers.
3. The affirmation states were aware or should have been
aware of the effect of these price lists on pricing practices of the manufacturers.
4. Uniform price increases by liquor manufacturers adversely affected the Pennsylvania citizens.
5. The affirmation statutes and agreements are a material
element in the conspiracy to affect prices.
If Pennsylvania is unable to show that the affirmation agreements
are directly related to the pricing conspiracy among manufacturers, there is no basis for finding the states in violation of the Sherman Act. Proving this involvement would be difficult, but several
factors make such proof quite possible. First, the association disseminating the information to the manufacturers, the N.A.B.C.A.,
did not exist before affirmation agreements became prevalent.
Second, the only states belonging to the association are affirmation states. Third, the only manufacturers belonging are those
dealing in affirmation states. Fourth, the association was formed
originally to assure compliance -- A the affirmation agreements.
The affirmation agreements wvere, therefore instrumental in the
creation of the organization which produced Sherman Act violations. These states also encouraged the price dissemination by requiring the accumulation of such information for their own purposes. Linking the affirmation states with a price fixing conspiracy is possible though not probable.
C.

Affirmation Agreements As A Direct Restraint of Trade under
The Sherman Act

Rather than attempting to indict affirmation by proving a
conspiracy among liquor manufacturers and linking the affirmation states to this conspiracy, it is also possible to prove that the
affirmation system itself is a combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade. In examining whether the affirmation laws themselves
create an unreasonable restraint of trade we must examine the
specific effects of these laws, determine whether these effects restrain trade, and finally consider whether the unlawful combination itself exists.

Affirmation laws prohibit a manufacturer from giving purchasers quantity purchase price discounts. Thus, although Pennsylvania might purchase one thousand cases of a specific brand of
liquor, affirmation laws prevent the manufacturer from giving
Pennsylvania a lower price than a wholesaler in New York who
purchases ten cases. This is true even though it can be shown
that the manufacturer has far lower average costs in Pennsylvania
resulting from the quantity sale. This additional burden borne by
the Pennsylvania citizen effectively restrains trade in liquor in this
state in the following manner. The price paid for a bottle of
liquor is, for example, one dollar in Pennsylvania, the same price
paid for this bottle in New York. With quantity discounting, however, the liquor would more likely cost ninety cents in Pennsylvania. Effectively, New York and the other affirmation states
have imposed on Pennsylvania citizens an import tariff. This tariff is paid not to the affirmation states, but to the manufacturer in
the form of excess profits.
Since only restraints which are unreasonable are illegal under
the Sherman Act we must consider whether affirmation law restraints are reasonable. We therefore turn to an examination of
the Robinson-Patman Act which, although forbidding price discrimination generally, specifically allows it in certain "reasonable"
situations. The Robinson-Patman Act specifically allows for price
discrimination resulting from reduced costs due to quantity sales.
The purpose of the Act was to make price discrimination unlawful
only where such discrimination tends to create monopoly or to injure, destroy or prevent competition and not to afford a shelter by
which manufacturers could reap excessive profits. The RobinsonPatman Act specifically provides:
[T] hat nothing contained shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to
such purchasers sold or delivered .... 203
Robinson-Patman, therefore, specifically exempts price variances
resulting from varied average costs. Affirmation statutes take
away this exemption in contravention of federal law and indicate
to some degree the unreasonableness of affirmation laws. The
New York affirmation statute grants price variances only as follows:
[P]rovided that nothing contained in paragraphs (d) and
(c) of this subdivision shall prevent differentials in price
which make only due allowance for differences
20 4 in state
taxes and fees, and in the actual cost of delivery.
It must be conceded that delivery costs are one of the elements
which reduce the average cost of large quantity sales. To that
extent the affirmation laws are in conformity with Robinson-Pat203. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1961).
204. N.Y. Aico. B-v. CONTROL § 101-b(9) (McKinney Supp. 1964).
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man. However, there are many other cost reductions resulting
from large quantity sales which are permissible under RobinsonPatman but denied by the affirmation laws. This result of affirmation laws, excessive cost to Pennsylvania citizens and excessive profits to manufacturers, contravene the intention of the Robinson-Patman Act and violate the Sherman Act through an unreasonable trade restraint.
In addition to inflated prices in Pennsylvania, affirmation
laws also create artificial entry barriers into the manufacture and
sale of liquor. These barriers lessen competition and result in inflated prices to Pennsylvania citizens. The following example
will explain how these barriers result. A small manufacturer selling only in a single non-affirmation state decides to expand his
selling market and, to meet competition in the second state, sells at
a reduced price there. The manufacturer decides to expand to a
third state. Realizing that he cannot maintain the low profit margin of state two in state three, he decides to sell in state three at
the same price as in state one. However, he learns that both states
two and three are affirmation states. There is, as a result of affirmation, an artificial barrier placed on entry into state three.
That barrier is that the manufacturer must sell in state three at
the same price he is selling at in state two. However, the manufacturer cannot sustain this low profit margin in both states. He
therefore has two choices: retain his price in state two and not
expand; or raise his state two price to a comfortable margin and
sell in both states two and three at a higher price. Presuming that
the manufacturer expands and Pennsylvania is state two, this state
has suffered harm due to increased prices and reduced price competition.
In conjunction with the above argument it should be remembered that, although the primary purpose of the Robinson-Patman
Act is to prevent price discrimination, 20 5 the act has been specifically interpreted to allow price reductions in certain circumstances
to meet lower prices of competition. 206 The key factor in considering whether such price reductions are valid is whether they are
made in good faith. 20 7 In analyzing the effect of New York's af205. See F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
The
Robinson-Patman Act was enacted to prevent the use of localized price
cutting by financially powerful corporations attempting to lessen competition. See also F.T.C. v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
206. F.T.C. v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Standard Oil Co.
v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231 (1951); Gerber Products Co. v. Beech-Nut Life
Savers, 160 F. Supp. 916 (D.C.N.Y. 1958); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v.
F.T.C., 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948).
207. See State v. Texaco, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 625, 111 N.W.2d 918 (1961).

firmation statute on a manufacturer it must be remembered that if
he makes a good faith price reduction in, for example, California,
in order to meet low prices charged by local manufacturers of
liquor, this reduction in price must also be given in New York.
Since this price reduction in New York is not made in good faith
to meet competition, but instead has the opposite effect, the manufacturer has been forced to unreasonably restrain trade.
The simplicity with which this unreasonableness is shown ignores the most important aspect of such violations. The price discrimination 208 resultant from the affirmation statute is not necessarily unreasonable. It must be shown that it is reasonably probable that such discrimination will have the effect of substantially
reducing competition or will tend to create a monopoly. 20 9 In the
Joseph E. Seagrams v. Hostetter 10 case, the Court recognized the
possibility that the state affirmation statute could be in contradiction of the Robinson-Patman Act. However, proof of such a violation is extremely difficult. The affirmation agreements and
statutes are so widespread that virtually no manufacturer is
exempt from their effects. The result is that wholesale prices of
liquor are virtually standard throughout the country and there
are no quantity or local price discounts to meet local competition.
If it can be shown that affirmation laws have the effect of
preventing expansion of manufacturers and corresponding price
competition, these affirmation laws contravene the purpose of the
exceptions to the Robinson-Patman Act and violate the Sherman
Act restraint of trade provisions.
The sole consideration remaining is whether the affirmation
states create the combination or conspiracy required for a Sherman Act violation. Traditionally, a finding of conspiracy under
the Sherman Act has required some evidence of agreement whether
formal or informal. In Interstate Circuit v. United States2 11 such
a conspiracy was held to exist where there was "[a]cceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried
out, is restraint of interstate commerce." In Interstate Circuit,
film distributors agreed with certain first-run theater owners
that they would not sell second-run rights to other theaters unless
they agreed to specified minimum admission prices. Only two
208. Price discrimination is proven merely by showing a price difference. F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960). See also
Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 942 (D.C. Conn. 1966).
209. Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (D.C.
N.Y. 1960).
210. 384 U.S. 35 (1966). See notes 156-57 and accompanying text
supra. A state act is invalid if it conflicts with either the language or the
policy of a federal act. See Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S.
373 (1954); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Northern Securities v. United States, 193
U.S. 197 (1904).
211. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 217 (1939).
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distributors agreed in writing to the restrictions. The Court indicated that:
While the District Court's finding of an agreement of the
distributors among themselves is supported by the evidence, we think that in the circumstances of this case such
agreement for the imposition of the restrictions upon subsequent-run exhibitors was not-prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it. Each distributor was advised that the others
were asked to participate; each knew that cooperation was
essential to successful operation of the plan. They knew
that the plan, if carried out, would result in a restraint of
commerce, which, we will presently point out, was unreasonable within the meaning of the 212
Sherman Act, and
knowing it, all participated in the plan.
Interstate Circuit is significant precedent in attempting to prove a
conspiracy by the affirmation states, since it expressly rejects any
requirement of a formal agreement among conspirators. It is
certain no such formal agreement among the affirmation states
could ever be proven. It is additionally relevant since it imposes
Sherman Act sanctions for knowledge and acquiescence of collaborative action among the participants. The affirmation states
were well aware of similar actions by other states. The final requirement of Interstate Circuit is troublesome, however. Showing
that the affirmation states impliedly agreed or knew of the effect
such affirmation laws would have on interstate commerce would
be difficult to prove. It is obvious that an action by film distributors requiring specific minimum admission fees to second-run movies will restrain competition between such theaters and those theaters showing first-run movies. However, it is not obvious that
demanding the lowest price for liquor will restrain interstate
commerce unlawfully when considered in light of the twentyfirst amendment which affords broad powers over liquor to the
individual states. The proof of implied agreement in the typical
conspiracy action under the Sherman Act could prove disastrous
to the action.
Several recent cases involving restraint of trade seem to transfer the emphasis in such cases away from the agreement requirement to an emphasis on the restraint requirement. An early case,
F.T.C. v. Beechnut Packing Co., 213 began this trend. In Beechnut,
the manufacturer refused to sell to dealers refusing to comply with
minimum price requirements. Although no express compliance
agreement existed, the Court found:
212.
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The specific facts found show suppression of the freedom
of competition by methods in which the company secures
the cooperation of its distributors and customers, which
are quite as effectual as agreements express
or implied in214
tended to accomplish the same purpose.
The Beechnut Court seems to be tending toward elimination of any
agreement requirement for a finding of conspiracy. It can readily
be argued, however, that an implied agreement was, in fact, present.
In

United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 215 the Court held:

"whether an unlawful combination or conspiracy is proved is to be
judged by what the parties actually did rather than by the words
they used. '2 1 6 Again the Supreme Court is placing the emphasis
on the result, the restraint, rather than on the showing of agreement to restrain. This movement in the direction of restraint is
emphasized in Albrecht v. Herald Co.217 wherein the Court specifically distinguishes conspiracies from combinations:
On the undisputed facts recited by the Court of Appeals respondent's conduct cannot be deemed wholly unilateral and beyond the reach of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
That section covers combinations in
218 addition to contracts
and conspiracies, express or implied.
Albrecht finds a distinction between a conspiracy, which by definition requires some finding of agreement, and combination, which
does not necessitate such a finding of agreement.
In the Albrecht case, in addition to distinguishing between
traditional conspiracies and combinations the Court seemed to suggest that an unwilling or unsuspecting party could constitute part
of such a combination. Thus, in a footnote, the majority commented:
Petitioner's amended complaint did allege a combination between respondent and petitioner's customers. Because of our disposition of this case it is unnecessary to
pass on 1this
claim. It was not, however, a frivolous con9
tention.2
It is significant that the Court recognized that an unsuspecting
individual (the customers here lacked knowledge of any restraint
of trade implications involved in merely changing the party from
whom they purchased newspapers) could be party to a restraint of
trade violation since the typical conspiracy case has always required some finding of agreement. There can be no agreement,
even implied, by a person who lacks all knowledge of what is occurring. An extension of Albrecht would permit a finding of
combination where there was no indication of agreement by any
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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parties involved. In Albrecht the newspaper was fully aware of
its actions, whereas in the affirmation situation it must be presumed that no one is aware. This extension of Albrecht is a
large one.
Albrecht further indicates that a finding of a combination
forcing maintainance of a specified price constitutes a restraint of
trade violation:
It is our view, therefore, that the combination formed by
the respondent in this case to force petitioner to maintain
a specified price for the resale of the newspapers which he
had purchased from respondent constituted, without more,
restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman
an illegal
220
Act.
The Court found that proof of the combination, with a purpose of
fixing maximum prices, was sufficient of itself to constitute an
illegal restraint of trade. Quoting from Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons the Court in Albrecht found:
[A] greements to fix maximum prices "no less than those
to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and
thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with
their own judgment."22' 1
Since the affirmation statutes by their specific terms, force minimum prices on the manufacturers, the sole consideration is
whether the combination itself can be proved. If the Albrecht
case can be extended in the manner previously discussed, proof of
the combination necessary to show a restraint of trade violation
by the affirmation states might be accepted by the courts.
VII.

CONCLUSION AS TO THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Any control over the sale of alcoholic beverages must be considered in light of the twenty-first amendment. 222 Analysis of
the conflict between the twenty-first amendment and the commerce clause indicates that liquor affirmation laws must comply
with federal commerce clause powers.223 Therefore, affirmation
laws cannot lawfully result in an unreasonable restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act. 224 In examining affirmation laws in light
of the Sherman Act we first determine whether any state action
can be violative of this statute. 225 Concluding in the affirmative,
220. Id. at 153.
221. Id. at 152 quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340
U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
222. See note 12 supra.
223. See text accompanying notes 155-57 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 164-68 supra.
225. See text accompanying notes 171-80 supra.

we next consider possible attacks on the affirmation laws under
the Sherman Act. There are two plausible arguments upon which
to base a contention that the states having affirmation laws have
violated the Sherman Act. First, affirmation laws or agreements
result in unlawful combinations under the Sherman Act.226 Sustaining this allegation against the affirmation states requires proof
that liquor manufacturers combined unlawfully and exchanged
current price information with an intent or agreement to affect
prices.2 27 This pricing conspiracy must be then directly linked to
the affirmation agreements of the states.228 The second basis for
finding the affirmation states in violation of the Sherman Act is
to prove that these affirmation agreements directly and unlawfully
restrained trade. 229 This might be proved through direct testimony of manufacturers who were prevented from selling in certain states due to affirmation. 280 Further proof of the restraint is
a showing that no quantity purchase discounts are permitted under affirmation laws. 28 ' Finally, the unreasonableness of this restraint might be shown by proving affirmation substantially reduces competition or tends to create a monopoly.23 2 The extraordinary burden of proof in any Sherman Act case coupled with the
additional burden here of having states as defendants makes the
possibility of success in an attack on affirmation laws doubtful.
PAUL R. OBER
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